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Abstract: This article focuses on the implications of Sunni persecution of Ahmadiyyat by analyzing
texts by the movement’s founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, to identify the epistemological basis of
his claims to prophecy in 19th century India. Rather than situating the claims within an Arabist,
juridico-theological lineage, as is normally done, the analysis emphasizes their points of convergence
with Persianate, Illuminationist theosophy of the 12th century mystic, Suhravardi. This convergence
rests on acknowledging the existence of an intermediate cosmological realm that Henry Corbin termed
the mundus imaginalis, which can be accessed by the subtle imagination of spiritual adepts and
prophets. Situating Ahmadiyyat within the Persianate theosophical tradition sheds new light on the
community’s persecution. In declaring Ahmadiyyat as “heresy,” and in Sunnism’s symbolic violence
against Ahmadiyyat, the theosophical features of Ahmad’s thought have also been marginalized.
Consequently, Sunni Muslims around the world are excluding Muslim access to the imaginal realm.
The conclusion points out how other communities have faced and are facing similar exclusion on
similar grounds, and argues for further investigation into the axiom that exclusion of the imaginal is
a feature of modernity.
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1. Introduction
The Ahmadiyya community has been the subject of much enquiry on account of its extreme
persecution by Muslims worldwide. In Pakistan, where the community was based from 1947 till 1984,
Ahmadis are considered heretics and are subject to unprecedented structural discrimination, physical
violence and symbolic bans on communication (Yusuf 2012). Public Ahmadiyyat has been effectively
criminalized in Pakistan since 1984 (Qadir 2015). Around the world, about 12 million community
members face exclusion and often violence by non-Ahmadi Muslims. Ahmadis consider themselves
Muslims and, unlike Bahais (who were also declared heretics in the 19th century), they refuse to accept
a status as non-Muslims, resulting in their ambiguous role as an insider-Other in Islam.
In general, there has not been much scholarship on Ahmadis. Most of the literature tends to
describe and explain the causes of exclusion by reducing it to socio-economic, colonialist (Lavan 1972),
and political/nation-building (Khan 2012a, 2012b; Saeed 2007) factors, or to analyze the international
law/human-rights violations (Khan 2003; Lathan 2008; Mahmud 1995; Uddin 2013). Such descriptions
have shed much light on the dynamics of Ahmadi discrimination in Pakistan, and generally on
state-building by way of exclusion. Similar national identity processes are at work in other Muslim
majority countries, such as Saudi Arabia (AI 2007), Indonesia (Burhani 2014), Egypt (AFP 2010),
or Kyrgyzstan (RFE/RL 2011). Indeed, exclusionary effects are also common in Muslim minority
contexts, such as Bulgaria (Corley 2006), Belarus (Fagan 2003), or South Africa (Qadir 2016). However as
reductive accounts, such analyses of exclusion tend to brush aside the matter at stake—religious
difference—to look for more “real” explanations. Moreover, such explanations cannot answer the
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question: why are Ahmadis subject to this level of persecution and not other, even more “heterodox”
Muslim communities in Pakistan?1 Similarly, attention to the consequences of hereticization again
focuses on the political and legal implications, ignoring religious outcomes.
This oversight is partly because the drivers of religious change are typically considered to lie
outside religion and in broader societal forces. By implication, religion is considered to be largely static
and defined by fixed dogmas. Despite considerable scholarship on the topic, most religions are still
approached by scholars and public through the lenses of (Protestant) Christianity and Cartesianism.
In reality, it is more often the case that what is considered doctrinaire changes over time due to changes
within a religious framework that correspond to, but are not necessarily caused by, wider social
trends. Abdulkader Tayob (2009) argued convincingly that Islamic discourse has undergone numerous
changes, responding to “external” signals like colonial modernity, but processing them in “internal”
discursive shifts. Such religious change tends to settle as the new mainstream, often in discursive
opposition to a constituent Other. Ebrahim Moosa (2014), for instance, describes the “sedimentation”
of orthodox Sunnism over time in tension with doctrines of Shi’ism. In that context, what does the
hereticization of Ahmadis by non-Ahmadi Muslims worldwide mean for religiosity? Although Shi’as
have also been at the forefront of Ahmadi persecution in South and southeast Asia, the most vocal
opponents of Ahmadiyyat are found amongst Sunnis. The crux of the matter is the claim to prophecy
by the movement’s founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, a claim that is violently disputed by almost all the
billion other Muslims around the world. What is at stake in this claim and its persecution?
This paper addresses these questions by unpacking the actual conflict: the claims of Ahmadiyyat’s
founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, to have received revelations. In fact, the claims in themselves are not
enough to transform Ahmadi heterodoxy into heresy, since they are situated within a well-developed
and classically supported (if not mainstream) approach to Islam, that is, mystical Islam or Sufism.
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad did not classify himself as a “Sufi” and often argued that the practice of tasawwuf
(spirituality) had been corrupted in South Asia. Indeed, the category of “Sufism” is notoriously too
broad (and possibly too artificial) (Ernst 2007) to identify any precise convergence with Ghulam
Ahmad’s thought, although I mention some points further on.
My argument here is that much of the grounding for the Sunni persecution of Islam is based
on conceptually locating him within a tradition of Arabist theology, where he appears not simply
as heterodox but as heretical. This same location is uncritically followed also by scholarship that
seeks to explain Ahmadi persecution by way of socio-economic factors. However, if Ahmadiyyat is
conceptually located in the tradition known as Persianate theosophy, as Ahmad himself seemed to
do, we may recover new insights into the persecution. In addition to how all the “external” factors
above impact on contemporary Ahmadi persecution, we can then also see what “internal” shifts in
Islamic discourse are taking place by way of this exclusion. By analyzing a selection of Ahmad’s
texts, I propose that he is better located conceptually in the Islamic theosophical tradition that placed
emphasis on what Sorbonne scholar of Islamic Studies, Henry Corbin (1964, 1977; Corbin [1969] 1997),
termed the “subtle imagination.” Appreciating the role of the subtle imagination in Ghulam Ahmad’s
claims is fundamental to understanding the global persecution of Ahmadis and what it says about the
larger body of Sunni Muslims who hereticize them. It is also a more precise conceptual location than
relatively vague references to Sufism.
Exclusion is a common feature in any religious group, and is becoming more important in the
rapidly growing world religion of Islam (Nasr 2006). Therefore, by understanding what exclusion
of Ahmadiyyat entails conceptually and theologically, it is possible to draw implications for Islam
more broadly and even for religion as a dynamic, discursive category. The analysis of any particular
tradition being excluded such as Ahmadiyyat is, of course, highly specific, but the findings presented
1 A notable example is of the Zikri community in south-western Pakistan (Ahmed 2002).
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here give insights into intra-Islam issues, and can be tested for general religious study implications in
future research.
This paper draws on an analysis of selections from Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s voluminous oeuvre
(80 books plus letters and sermons). There has been little commentary on these writings, even from
prominent Ahmadi detractors. The major scholarship on Ahmad’s claims remains Friedmann’ (2003)
magisterial work, which, however, addresses largely juridical aspects and Arabist references, brushing
aside their theosophical, Persianate features.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section presents a brief description of the Ahmadi
community and the persecution they face. It also introduces the texts for this analysis. The section after
that presents a theoretical framing of the imaginal to situate Ghulam Ahmad’s claims, drawing on
Henry Corbin’s commentary on Islamic theosophy of illumination propounded by the influential
12th century mystic, Suhravardi. Next, three aspects of epistemology in the claim to prophecy are
presented. In the last section, the implications of these aspects are discussed with regard to the import
of persecution.
2. A Brief Background to Ahmadiyyat: Claims and Persecution
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (b. 1835) declared in 1880 in a major work—Barahin-e-Ahmadiyya—that
he had received divine inspiration to reform the condition of Muslims in British India (Ahmad 1880).
In November 1888, he invited Muslims to be initiated under his guidance and held a major ceremony
for dozens of new initiates the following March. The ceremony became an annual event (ijma’) and
marked the beginning of Ahmadiyyat as an Islamic reform movement centered in the town of Qadian
in British-ruled Punjab, now in India.
Over a decade or so, Ghulam Ahmad made four important spiritual claims. He first referred to
himself as the mujaddid [reformer] of the century, drawing on a tradition that a reformer of the religion
would appear every 100 years. Arguing that no one had been ascribed the title in the beginning of
the 14th Islamic century (from 1882 AD), he claimed that title for himself and described numerous
challenges faced by the Muslim world as his reform task. Second, he referred to himself as muhaddath
[a person spoken to by God]. This was a more extravagant title, since Sunni Muslims had only ever
agreed unanimously to use this title for one person in Islamic history: The Caliph Umar, a companion
of the Prophet Muhammad and his second successor. However, some Sufi traditions claimed that
numerous muhaddathun (plural) had appeared in Islamic history and that their status should be
considered as that of prophets in potentiality (Friedmann 2003).
The third title Ghulam Ahmad claimed emerged from his revelations: that of mahdi [guided
one, typically used by Shia’s for the eschatological 12th imam] and masih [messiah]. With this claim,
as early as 1893 (recorded in his A’ina-yi kamalat-i Islam, p. 426) Ahmad claimed to be the second
coming of Jesus. He interpreted the Quran and various Islamic traditions to argue that Jesus had
survived the crucifixion, been healed, continued his mission in the east (probably in Kashmir), and died
a natural death at the age of over 100.2 He further contended that the second coming of Jesus in the
New Testament and the Quran should be taken symbolically and not literally, and that he was to
complete the promised role of Jesus (to lead the faithful in prayer at the end of times). As Friedmann
shows, this claim aided Ghulam Ahmad in his debates to contest the British-claimed “superiority” of
Christianity over Islam. However, there is no direct evidence that this was the guiding, ulterior motive.
2 This claim might seem audacious to many audiences today, particularly in (post)Christian contexts. Yet, there has been
a long-standing debate on the possibility of Jesus’ missing years and life past 33 having taken place in Kashmir. The claim
draws partly on the Bhavishya Purana, partly on stories of Krishna, and partly on long-standing folk tales of the tomb of a
“Judaic” prophet at Roza Bal shrine in Srinagar. See, for example, Kersten (1986). German Indologist Günter Grönbold,
as well as texts published by the Pontificia Universita Gregorianà and others, roundly criticized Kersten’s research and
revival of older scholarship on the topic. All of these and others refer to Ahmad as a major source of the “fallacy.”
Regardless of the accuracy of the claim, it is evident that this is a long, albeit minority, tradition of beliefs.
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The claim to be masih, and the correlated argument that Jesus had not been bodily lifted from
the cross to return physically at the end of days (as most Muslims believe) provoked a remarkable
controversy. However, it was overshadowed by Ghulam Ahmad’s fourth claim: to have received
revelation that he was a prophet.
It is difficult to overstate the ensuing furor raised by this. Ghulam Ahmad’s claim violated
a deeply held belief among Muslims then (and which has only increased since) that Muhammad
was the last of the prophets sent by God. The Ahmadi response to this rests on a now-uncommon
interpretation of the Quranic reference (33:40) to Muhammad as khatim al-anbiya’ [final prophet] and of
a hadith [oral tradition] in which he said he was the “seal of the prophets” (Al-Bukhari, Sahih, Kitab
al-manaqib 18, vol. 2, p. 390). The common interpretation considers khatim [final] as temporal finality,
implying that Muhammad was the last in time of a succession of over 124,000 prophets sent by God;
prophecy therefore was sealed (closed, shut down) after his death in AD 632.3 Ahmadis interpret
the term as logical finality: khatim as ultimate and, thus, that Muhammad is the ultimate “seal,”
or guarantee of authenticity, to perfect all prophecies. Once again, the claim drew on a long-standing,
albeit minor, theological tradition. In the early days of Islamic thought, there was never a complete
consensus on the now-dominant temporal definition of the finality of prophethood; in fact, “this now
generally received understanding of the Qur’anic phrase [“final”] is not the only possible one and had
not necessarily been the earliest” (Friedmann 2003).
Ghulam Ahmad’s claim was situated within his prophetological scheme. For him, it was
inconceivable that God would abandon humanity without guidance after the death of Muhammad
(AD 632). He drew on classical kalam and Sufi sources—outside the mainstream but considered valid
generally—that bore out this contention and included a number of people as prophets from even other
religions, including Krishna and possibly Zoroaster. One inspiration for Ahmad was the Andalusian
Sufi theosopher, Ibn-al-’Arabi (d. 1240 AD). The latter, often referred to as Shaykh-al-Akbar [the greatest
master], also maintained that God provided guidance to humanity and continued to do so after the
death of Muhammad. Indeed, as Friedmann demonstrates, this was not an uncommon position for
classical scholars and Sufis in Islamic history of ideas.
For this position, and especially for Ibn-al-’Arabi and Ghulam Ahmad, prophets are not all equal,
and a major division can be made between those who revealed a new law of God (such as Moses or
Muhammad) and those who perfected or reflected that law to address the problem of the times (as Jesus
did for Moses). Ahmad’s claim was to be a “minor” prophet, reflected in the glory of the ultimate seal
of prophecy—Muhammad—and perfecting his message to reform the decay of the Muslim body in
19th century India.
Furthermore, in the tradition of continuing spiritual guidance and reform, he also established
a line of successors, now referred to as Caliphs in the community. This, and the continuing importance
of the annual jalsa [gathering] where new Ahmadis join the community, illustrates the significance of
bay’t [initiation] with Ghulam Ahmad as spiritual leader. The bay’t is an esoteric act tying a believer
together with a guide on a spiritual path. Literally translated from Arabic, meaning ‘to sell,’ the Islamic
practice of bay’t is an oath of allegiance by ‘selling’ one’s self in exchange for the spiritual guidance
given by an Imam or spiritual leader. The tradition can be traced back to Muhammad, and is common
practice in Sufi orders, although it is devalued, if not rejected outright, by Sunni orthodoxy including
in South Asia. The Ahmadiyya hold a bay’t ceremony during the annual gathering of the community
now in the UK, when the Ahmadi Caliph takes the oath from new converts.
3 This view is amplified in Urdu, Pakistan’s national language, in which the root word “khatm” is strictly ambiguous but
in common parlance often connotes “final” as “last.” Sunni Muslims stress temporal finality more than Shi’a; the latter
defend temporal finality of prophethood equally but allow for and even rely on ongoing spiritual guidance by imams,
even infallible ones. Arabic, similarly to Hebrew, is based on triconsonantal or triliteral roots. As a result, most words may
have many meanings depending on how the sequence of three consonants is interspersed with vowels. Meanings are often
gleaned from contexts, and ambiguity is common in interpretations.
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2.1. Ahmadi Persecution
Ghulam Ahmad’s claims were certainly heterodox in 19th century India, but they were not
unique. Indeed, they tied to a strand of theology that had lost traction over time. Moreover, even the
claim to prophethood was rooted in some ecstatic Sufi lineages and in Persianate Islamic traditions.
However, at the time, these claims and the practice of bay’t sparked a virtual pogrom against Ahmadis.
Popular and political Muslim opinion in the early days was not all hostile to Ahmadis but groups
demanding state action against Ahmadis grew in number and reach. After Pakistan was formed in
1947, the Ahmadiyya leader at the time, Ghulam Ahmad’s son, led the community out of its birthplace
in Indian Qadian to Lahore in Pakistan, and then to a new city nearby. Persecution of Ahmadis
found ample space in the new “Islamic” republic of Pakistan. Violence simmered and erupted
often involving looting, arson and murder of hundreds of Ahmadis. Eventually, the new National
Assembly of 1974 passed a unanimous constitutional amendment declaring Ahmadis heretics and
non-Muslims. The Second Constitutional Amendment of Pakistan declared the Ahmadiyya be treated
as non-Muslim minorities under law, invalidating Ahmadi claims to be Muslims, and associating
them as a political Other in the state-building process of Pakistan ((Khan 2012b), cf (Qadir 2015) for
an analysis of the parliamentary discussion passing the amendment). In 1984, the military President
Zia-ul-Haq promulgated an Ordinance that resulted in most Ahmadi activities becoming criminal
offences (Anti-Islamic Activities of the Qadiani Group, Lahori Group and Ahmadis (Prohibition and
Punishment) Ordinance, 1984).
As a result, Ahmadis are barred from calling themselves Muslim, praying or preaching in the
name of Islam, and exhibiting Islamic religiosity publicly—for example displaying Islamic symbols
or Quranic verses, distributing Islamic literature, using the kalimah, or calling their places of worship
“mosques” (Mahmud 1995; Siddiq 1995; Valentine 2008). Those accused of “posing” as Muslims can be
charged with blasphemy, which is punishable by death under Pakistani law. This led to unprecedented
structural discrimination: Ahmadis were barred from holding the office of President or Prime Minister
and were forced to vote in elections only for reserved minority seats, along with other non-Muslim
minority populations in Pakistan. The community boycotted this categorization, effectively leading to
their dis-enfranchisement.
The Ordinance also fed waves of public violence against the approximately six
million Ahmadis still in Pakistan, apparently condoned by religious authorities and state
officials (Idris 2008; Tanveer 2013; Yusuf 2012). Many Ahmadis emigrated from Pakistan, including
their spiritual and organizational head [Caliph], and at least six million now live elsewhere. However,
they are discriminated around the world, in Muslim majority countries like Bangladesh and Indonesia
as well as minority contexts, such as Bulgaria, Kyrgyzstan, and South Africa (Qadir 2014).
In the face of such violent and overt persecution, there has been notably little analysis of
the thought of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. Even Pakistan’s ideological founder, Muhammad Iqbal,
in his polemic against the Ahmadiyya, does not quote from Ghulam Ahmad, and only presents
mainstream arguments against any claims to “prophethood” after Muhammad (Iqbal 1973a, 1973b).
Iqbal’s focus was on the rupture caused by Ahmad among an otherwise “united” front of Muslims
in the sub-continent. Indeed, this was precisely the accusation relied on most by parliamentarians in
1974, who referred to Iqbal as a national authority.
The lack of attention to texts is surprising because Ghulam Ahmad’s claims to be mujaddid,
muhaddath, masih, and nabi cannot be isolated from his notions about religion, prophetology, the cosmos,
and modes of knowing. Not only do Ahmadiyyat’s political and theological accusers ignore these texts,
but in large part so have scholars. Friedmann has undertaken the most comprehensive analysis yet of
Ghulam Ahmad’s claims based on textual sources. However, he tends to contextualize the claims with
apparently strategic motivations by Ahmad to counter Hindu and Christian polemics against Islam.
More importantly, he overlooks the epistemological and mystical elements to concentrate on technical,
literal history. This gap is crucial, since the Othering of Ahmadiyyat in Islam and banning of their
publications in Pakistan (coupled with discouragement elsewhere) has meant not only that Ahmadis
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are widely considered non-Muslims. It has also meant that Ahmad’s epistemology and concomitant
approach to religious knowledge has been excluded. In many ways, the symbolic violence is almost as
severe as the physical violence.
2.2. Texts Reviewed
The worldwide Ahmadiyya community has published all of Ghulam Ahmad’s works online
in Urdu, Persian and Arabic (the languages they were written in) as well as some translations in
English (https://www.alislam.org/library/). The first work analyzed here is the essay Philosophy of the
Teachings of Islam (PTI), originally delivered as a talk at the Conference of Great Religions organized in
1896 in Lahore, British India, and subsequently translated into over 50 languages (Ahmad [1896] 1996).
At the time Ghulam Ahmad was already contesting other Muslims on his claims, but the
fledgling Ahmadiyya community had not yet faced the violent persecution that was soon to begin.
This still-unanalyzed work outlines Ahmad’s view about Islam, including his epistemology, and the
focus here is on the chapters entitled “The state of man after death” and “Sources of divine knowledge.”
Another important but scholarly neglected work is Tadhkirah [Notes] (TAD), a compilation
of dreams, visions and revelations from various sources that has been translated into more than
1100 pages in English, including a subject index of revelations (Ahmad [1976] 2009). Ahmadis have
used this to gain insight into the content of Ghulam Ahmad’s prophecies, but the focus here is on
the epistemology. The fact that dreams and visions have been meticulously diarized, and the fact
that Ahmadis continue to interpret and derive inspiration from this text, attest to the importance of
the imaginal in Ghulam Ahmad’s claim. Here, some insight into his explicit epistemology is gained
through his own, limited commentary on the dreams and visions, which have been faithfully translated
in the present edition.
The third text comprises extracts from Volume III of the five-volume compilation of speeches and
texts by Ghulam Ahmad, edited and translated in 1979 as “The Essence of Islam” (EOI) (Ahmad 1979).
About 120 pages of this volume includes speeches and writings on faith and certainty, the need for
prophets, and the meaning of prophethood in Islam. Among other sources, this volume includes
extracts from an important, lengthy book entitled Haqiqat-ul-Wahi [The Truth about Revelation],
which was published originally in Urdu in 1907 (Ahmad 1907). EOI also includes relevant extracts
from Barahin-e-Ahmadiyya [Proofs of Ahmadiyyat].
Although this is a limited selection from the large body of his writings, they already offer
a consistent insight into Ghulam Ahmad’s approach to the Self and knowledge about God.
Scattered within these texts and elsewhere are references to the 13th century AD Andalusian Sufi
master, Ibn-al-’Arabi, whose views are very similar and are rooted in what Henry Corbin calls
“mundus imaginalis” when he discusses the philosophy of illumination of renowned 12th century
mystic Suhravardi.
3. The Persianate Tradition of Illumination
The Illuminationist philosophy developed and propounded by Shahab-al-d. in Suhravardi
(d. about 1191 AD) has been the source of innumerable classic commentaries and modern
exegeses (Nasr 1983, 1997; Walbridge 2001; Ziai 1990). One of the most thorough is by the Sorbonne
scholar, Henri Corbin (1977), who explores Suhravardi’s claims to link his Hikmat-al-Ishraq (Philosophy
of Illumination) with classical Zoroastrian theology. For our purposes, there are three important
features to Suhravardi’s theosophy4 as interpreted by Corbin.
4 Nasr describes this term thus: “By theosophy we mean that wisdom which is neither theology nor philosophy but a form of
sapientia whose attainment depends upon intuition and illumination and as it is understood in the original Greek sense,
not as it is employed currently for pseudo-spiritual movements” (Nasr 1981, p. 166, fn. 4).
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3.1. Mundus Imaginalis
The first feature is the presence of a “real,” if invisible, world that the Illuminationists call Malaku¯t,
lying between the sensible world (Mulk) and the Angelic Intelligences (Jabaru¯t). Corbin translates this
with the Latin term mundus imaginalis, to avoid contemporary Western usages that he says are caught
up in a Cartesian dualism between body and mind, and that refuse to allow for the existence of an
intermediate order of reality, or one that is populated by incomplete or invisible bodies. Corbin uses the
term to avoid “betraying” the sense of the Arabic and Persian term ‘alam-al-mithal (literally, “world of
similitude” or “analogies”) from theosophical texts by Suhravardi and his copious commentator
Qut.b-al-din Shirazi (d. 1311 AD) (Corbin 1964, p. 1). The same term was profusely used by the great
Sufi master, Ibn-al-’Arabi, as well as the famous Mulla S. adra (d. 1640 AD). In his vast scholarship of
these theosophists, along with the Shaykhi school in Iran, Corbin links the idea of such an imaginal
world to Zoroastrian and, indeed, Platonic thought.
Corbin refers to mundus imaginalis as “a median and mediating universe, an intermediate
world between the sensible and the intellectual (intelligible), an intermediate world without which
articulation between sensible and Intellectual (intelligible) is definitely blocked” (Corbin 1977, p. viii).
This intermediary world has a history although, “The epochs of a spiritual world make up a history
sui generis, which is in its very essence imaginal history.” It has a geography, which he describes
in considerable detail, although again the geography is not that of the physical world but rather
a “visionary geography, the geography of a world that secretes its own light, like those Byzantine
mosaics whose gold illumines the space they encompass” (Corbin 1977, p. 21). The difference from
modern cartography or history could not be greater: the individual sits at the center of this world as
an Empyrean subject:
The presence of the subject at the center is not a situated presence but a situative presence.
In medio mundi, the soul is no longer bound to spatial coordinates. Instead of “falling into,”
of having to be situated in a predetermined space, the soul itself “spatializes,” is always the
origin of the spatial references and determines their structure. That is why we find here not
an empirical representation, but an archetypal figure. (Corbin 1977, p. 20)
Yet, the mundus imaginalis is not some purely intellectual realm, comprising cognitive objects.
It comprises real bodies, real places and cities, real persons, and real events. However, only mystics,
adepts, or prophets may perceive these. In that sense, mundus imaginalis is not the same as the Platonic
world of Forms, which is closer to the Islamic cosmological notion of Jabaru¯t (Corbin 1964, p. 6).
As Shirazi writes:
Therefore, imaginative forms exist neither in thought . . . nor in concrete reality, otherwise
anyone with normally healthy senses would be able to see them. But they are not merely
nonbeing . . . they are corporealized forms, not pure intelligibles—they must necessarily
exist in some other region and the latter is what is called the world of the archetypal
Image and of imaginative perception. It is a world intermediate between the world of
the Intelligence and the world of the senses; its ontological plane is above the world
of the senses and below the intelligible world; it is more immaterial than the first, less
immaterial than the second . . . [It is] the world of autonomous Images and Forms . . .
The prophets, the Initiates, the mystical theosophists have all acknowledged the existence of
this universe. (Corbin 1977, pp. 126, 131)
3.2. The “Subtle Imagination”
How is this world accessible? Shirazi notes that “the totality of the things which exist in the
higher world have their nadir and their analogue in the lower world” (Corbin 1977, p. 128). This is
the second important feature of Corbin’s reconstruction: the “subtle imagination” that can access
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the mundus imaginalis.5 Drawing on both ancient Zoroastrian and classical Islamic theosophy,
Corbin’s point is that the faculties of perception have long been reduced to either sensory (physical)
or intellectual (conceptual). This has foreclosed what he sees is the median faculty of the imaginal,
or “agent imagination.” Post-Cartesian thought has devalued knowledge that does not belong either
to the pole of the body or of the mind, and so has conceived of imagination as a subset of the mind but
only in a pejorative sense of “the imaginary, that is, the unreal, the mythic, the marvelous, the fictive,
etc.” (Corbin 1977, p. vii).
Corbin is scathing in his criticism of this neglect, which for him has foreclosed all access to the
spiritual. His greatest ally in this argument was the famous psychoanalyst and post-Jungian scholar
James Hillman, an avid proponent of the “poetic basis of the mind” (Hillman 1975; Cheetham 2015).
Corbin’s fundamental point is that the imaginary is absolutely not—and may even be opposed
to—the imaginal. Instead of reducing all imagination to mere fantasy, Corbin reads classical Islamic
theosophers as indicating two distinct elements: the fictive, ordinary imagination—by means of which
anybody can think up pink elephants and unicorns—and then the subtle imagination, which does not
think up anything, but rather catches, reflects (or brings down), spiritual reality—which requires practice.
So, “this [subtle] Imagination must be a purely spiritual faculty, independent of the physical organism
and therefore able to continue to exist after the latter has disappeared” (Corbin 1964, p. 9). Or:
This [subtle] Imagination does not construct something unreal, but unveils the hidden reality;
its action is, in short, that of the ta’wil—the spiritual exegesis practiced by all the Spirituals
of Islam—whose special quality is that of alchemical meditation: to occultate the apparent,
to manifest the hidden. (Corbin 1977, p. 12)
3.3. Grace of God
This brings us to the third significant feature of Corbin’s reading of Suhravardi and the
theosophers of Illumination. For them, access to the Imaginal world, through the subtle Imagination,
is not in the control of the practitioner: it is entirely in the gift and grace of God. Practitioners may
prepare themselves for the gift—by “polishing the soul”—but that dispensation is not in their hands
alone. God decides whom to grant access to the mundus imaginalis, to what extent, and with what
frequency. This, again, distinguishes the imaginary from the Imaginal: the former can be accessed by
anyone and for any purpose, while the latter requires spiritual training. The nature of access to the
Imaginal may vary, but it is fully integrated into the senses: recipients can hear, see, feel, and taste the
Imaginal world. Suhravardi again:
The suprasensory realities encountered by the prophets, the Initiates, and others appear to
them sometimes in the form of lines of writing, sometimes in the hearing of a voice which
may be gentle and sweet and which can also be terrifying. Sometimes they see human forms
of extreme beauty who speak to them in most beautiful words and converse with them
intimately about the invisible world; at other times these forms appear to them like delicate
figures from the most refined art of the painters. (Corbin 1977, p. 132)
So, prophecy is a form of access to the Imaginal that can also be achieved by spiritual initiates,
albeit to a lesser degree. It is dependent only on God’s grace, but initiates can prepare themselves
(“polish the mirror” of the soul) for receiving the grace to access it. Preparation may be practical
(helping others), or devotional (praying), or intellectual (practicing ta’wil). The latter, although often
5 In most cases, Corbin refers to the “Active Imagination,” but this is open to mis-interpretation if the capitalization is omitted.
It also connotes a sense of fancifulness that is precisely the opposite of what Corbin intended. Moreover, Jung used the
term as part of his therapeutic technique, giving it a very narrow and further mis-leading sense. I use “subtle imagination”
instead to avoid mis-readings, and draw here on Corbin’s occasional use in some texts of the “subtle organ” (Corbin 1964).
Subtle here does not mean “delicate,” but rather sensitive (to the imaginal realm); yet there is an element of activity involved,
as discussed in this section.
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reserved as a term for Shi’ite interpretations of the Quran, was a wide-spread practice in South Asian
Islam up until the 19th century AD. Literally, it means “to carry back” to the origin, or principle. But,
when extended:
the ta’wil is essential symbolic understanding, the transmutation of everything visible
into symbols, the intuition of an essence or person in an Image which partakes neither of
universal logic nor of sense perception, and which is the only means of signifying what is to
be signified. (Corbin [1969] 1997, p. 13)
For those practicing ta’wil, the literal words of the Quran—or the hadith (sayings of the Prophet) or
sayings of Companions—are doorways to symbolic meaning. In this view, even (or perhaps, especially)
persons are symbolic of their celestial archetypes, and ta’wil is not merely a hermeneutical/exegetic
technique, but rather a way of ascending the spiritual ladder to knock at heaven’s door.
4. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s Epistemology and the Subtle Imagination
The Persianate/Imaginal frame of thinking provides a pathway to understanding Ghulam
Ahmad’s thought and claims different from the more Arabist/juridical-theological approach of
Friedmann. It is worth recalling that Ghulam Ahmad suggested that Zoroaster could be considered one
of God’s prophets, contrary to many but not all Muslims (Friedmann 2003, p. 124). He also laid claim
to a Persian heritage, including as revealed to him by God (e.g., TAD, 48, 91), and held that 19th century
India was “Persian” in its Islamic nature (TAD, 64), foreshadowing a common scholarly understanding
of Indian Islam today (Arjomand 2017). He further held that Muhammad had prophesied a time at
which Muslims would become errant, following which “a man of Persian origin would be raised to
teach them [Muslims] the faith” (TAD, 221).
Ahmad’s writings and record of revelations are replete with metaphors (not similes) of light,
flame/ fire, illumination, halos around celestial bodies of earthly persons, and doors. All this evokes
the Illuminatist theosophy of Suhravardi, which there is no record of Ahmad ever having read or
quoted. He also relies on the complex theosophist terminology, brought to fruition by Ibn-al-’Arabi,
of the barzakh, or intermediary realm between the created world and the heavens (typically plural in
Ahmad’s writings). It is precisely this that Corbin designated Mundus Imaginalis. However, it is his
epistemology rather than his literary style that connects Ahmad to the Persian classical theosophy as
described by Henry Corbin. Three elements stand out as the basis of his claims: the nature of spiritual
knowledge, the nature of spiritual knowers, and the nature of revelation.
4.1. Selfhood and Knowledge
Ghulam Ahmad’s ideas about knowledge stem from his understanding of the three-fold nature
of the Self. In Philosophy of the Teachings of Islam (PTI) he argues that the Self is not a uniform entity,
but rather has is multi-layered. The highest aspect is the spiritual Self, which moves naturally toward
God, who can grace it to bestow Paradise in this world.
This complexity of the structure of the human Self means that aspects and elements of a Self can
achieve spiritual knowledge, which itself is also not uniform but is of three types (PTI, 134, 172–75
and Essence of Islam (EOI), 77). The first type is knowledge by way of inference or by reason: seeing
smoke leads a person to think there is fire somewhere nearby. The second is knowledge by way of
sight: seeing the fire confirms its presence. The third is knowledge by way of experience: not trusting
the eyes, which may be deceived, but rather feeling the fire warm one’s body or burn one’s hand.
For Ghulam Ahmad, all three can lead to knowledge of God, but they are progressive and only the
last may be termed certainty. He divides spiritual knowledge further into various stages. Once more,
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this is an almost standard epistemology of theosophers and of South Asian Sufis.6 The entry to all
stages of knowledge for Ahmad, as for most Sufis, is unquestioning faith:
this is what helps open the door of Divine grace and becomes the means of acquiring good
fortune here and in the hereafter. When a person establishes himself firmly on faith and then
seeks to foster his knowledge through prayer . . . God Almighty Himself, . . . taking him
by the hand, leads him from the stage of faith to that of ‘ain-al-yaqin [certainty by sight] . . .
Faith means acceptance at a stage when knowledge is not yet complete, and the struggle with
doubts and suspicions is still in progress . . . faith is related to the unseen. (EOI, 43, 48, 50)
Both faith and the knowledge that attends upon it are “achieved only through God Himself . . .
This is not a matter of man’s own choice” (PTI, 54). So, there are:
three grades of the perfection of good fortune, namely fana [extinction of the self],
baqa [revival] and liqa’ [communion.] ‘Complete submission to Allah’ means to surrender to
Him all human faculties and organs, and whatever belongs to oneself, and to dedicate
everything to the cause of God . . . when a person achieves such a high grade in his
comprehension of the Divine, certainty, trust and love . . . as if he is already enjoying it,
and his belief in the Being of God Almighty becomes so certain as if he is beholding Him
. . . and every spiritual bounty appears present before him, that condition which is free from
all constraint and is secure against every doubt and apprehension . . . is designated liqa’
. . . The grade of liqa’ is achieved perfectly when Divine reflection completely covers the
humanity of the seeker . . . some seekers have conceived the symbolic relationship as the
physical union of two beings. (EOI, 60–61)
At this stage, “when a seeker after God arrives at the end of his search he reverts to where God
is. The perfection of his ascent or approach to God becomes the cause of his descent towards man”
(TAD, 87). Persistent effort by a believer is required for a “sacrifice of himself in the cause of God”
(PTI, 88). Indeed, “one does not attain to high spiritual status until one submits himself to a kind of
slaughter and death” (TAD, 22). But the crowning achievement “is a pure bounty, and is bestowed
upon the believer without any further effort or toil” (EOI, 81). The belief that only God opens the doors
to the imaginal, too, is a feature of theosophy and Sufism.
4.2. Men of God and Prophets
Ghulam Ahmad calls one who achieves the ultimate stage of liqa’ as among the “children of God”
(EOI, 61), or “a godly person . . . a man of heaven” (PTI, 131). At the final stage of spiritual fulfillment,
“when a person arrives at the grade of liqa,’ he manifests Divine powers on the occasions of the upsurge
of this grade” (EOI, 63). Then, the seeker “perceives a brilliant light illumining his inner self like the
dawning of the day; and he observes streams of devotion, love and loyalty flowing mightily through
himself and feels every moment as if God Almighty has descended upon his heart” (EOI, 65).
But such seekers do not merely know God in a rational, intellectual sense. Ahmad states that such
seekers attend “upon the threshold of God, like the angel Gabriel.” In a state of ultimate communion
with the Creator, “a believer, reflecting Divine qualities, becomes a vice-regent of God and reflects
Divine features . . . the fire of Divine love envelops him and the flame of light wholly consumes the
framework of his ego and takes its place. This is the climax of the blessed love of God” (EOI, 91, 102).
In this ecstatic state of union with God, “the wonders of Providence are revealed to the seeker and
he experiences such Divine favors as are hidden from others. He is favored with true visions and is
honored with the words of God and is informed of the delicate mysteries of the hereafter” (EOI, 101).
6 For instance, see Chittick (1989). Indeed, such an epistemological basis is deep-rooted in Sufi thought that it is almost taken
for granted and rarely explicated.
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These men of God, for Ahmad, reflect Divine qualities: their eyes see beyond the created world
and into the mundus imaginalis, their tongues, hands and ears become organs of God, their foreheads
are “blessed with a light,” and so on. In the ultimate stage of communion, Ahmad states that,
“The heart of the seeker is a mirror which is so polished by calamities and hardships that he begins
to reflect the qualities of the Prophet [Muhammad]” (EOI, 109). Or, again, “The Holy Prophet,
may peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, is the true and the primary object of these divine
favors. They [blessings] are bestowed upon others merely on account of their relationship to him”
(TAD, 82). Devotion to Muhammad is a defining feature of Muslim practice generally but is especially
marked amongst Sufis. However, the latter seek specially to appreciate the full degree of perfection of
Muhammad’s prophecy and to be blessed by his reflection on their own spiritual path (for an excellent
discussion of this, see (Chittick 1989), cf. (Hirtenstein 1999)).
This is the crux of Ghulam Ahmad’s discussion of spiritual knowledge. Knowledge of God by
actual sight and observation, bestowed as a Divine bounty, results in a total loss of the ego of the man
of God to the extent that he displays Divine qualities; the ultimate display of Divine qualities, and so
the highest stage of communion, is the extent of prophets; and the highest stage of prophethood is
that of Muhammad, who encapsulates all the qualities of all the prophets of God and is the “climax”
(PTI, 86) of all prophethoods.
Prophets can be distinguished from otherwise spiritually knowledgeable persons by their social
mission to reform forgetful humanity:
Such a person in this manner combines within himself two opposites. He is turned completely
towards God and also completely towards God’s creatures . . . Anyone who arrives at this
station is turned towards and is pulled in two directions at the same time; one towards God
Who is Eternal and the other towards God’s creatures who have been brought into being
by Him. (TAD, 86)
“It should be remembered that it is the Prophets (peace be on them) who demonstrate the
existence of God and teach people His unity . . . [they] alone established through thousands
of signs and miracles that the Transcendent Being Who comprises all power does in fact
exist . . . Had there been no Prophets, no one would have achieved this degree of reason . . .
When God Almighty designs to reveal Himself to the world, He raises a Prophet, who is a
manifestation of Divine powers, and sends down His revelation to him and manifests His
Divine powers through him”. (EOI, 114)
In times of error and disbelief:
Allah becomes like a hidden treasure. Then He determines that He should again be known
to mankind and be recognized by people. For this purpose, He chooses one of His servants
and bestows upon him the mantle of Khilafat and is recognized through him . . . This has
been the way of Allah in every age since eternity. (TAD, 113)
Friedmann (2003, chp. 6) describes Ghulam Ahmad’s division of two Abrahamic lines. Just as
Isaac’s line was laid out in a final law with Moses and then perfected by Jesus, so Ismail’s line was laid
out in a final law with Muhammad and now perfected by Ahmad. While even some Ahmadis may
contest an exaggerated reading of this schema, it does lay the groundwork for an important feature of
Ahmad’s thought: prophets are not all of the same rank or all of the same type. There are degrees of
prophethood; besides, some were law-bearing, like Moses, while others were not, even if they were
highly exalted like Jesus. This distinction leads to Ahmad’s argument that the doors to revelation
may now be closed in Isaac’s line but have never been closed in Ismail’s line, in which Muhammad
appeared and is the ultimate prophet of any line.
If a “Prophet is one who receives revelation from God and is honored with converse with Him . . .
no harm is done,” says Ahmad, “if a follower of the Holy Prophet is raised as such a Prophet.” In fact:
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What is most harmful is to believe that the followers of the Holy Prophet (peace and blessings
of Allah be upon him) are debarred from enjoying converse with God until the Day of
Judgement. That religion is not worthy of being called a religion . . . whose followers cannot
come near enough to God to be honored with His word . . . As the Holy Quran does not
close the door of Prophethood whereby a person through obedience to the grace of the Holy
Prophet may be granted converse with God and may be informed of hidden matters through
Divine revelation, then what is there to stop the appearance of such a Prophet among the
Muslims?” (EOI, 127)
Yet, the seriousness of the claim to prophethood was not lost on Ghulam Ahmad. In numerous
instances, he mentions his “agony” at the response of Indian Muslims upon hearing his claim, and his
persistent prayers to relieve him of his trials (e.g., TAD, 88). In response, Ahmad received numerous
visions and revelations confirming his mission, and affirming that converse with God was very much
in the bounds of possibility for the righteous.
Indeed, says Ahmad, “Islam has always produced persons of this rank” (PTI, 183).
“Among Muslims thousands achieved sainthood by following the Holy Prophet alone” (EOI, 130).
Again: “a person who receives divine guidance and training, and becomes a recipient of revelation,
wears a mantle which properly belongs to Prophets and is loaned to a non-prophet” (TAD, 100).
For Ahmad, “A foolish one, who is in truth an enemy of the faith, does not desire that converse with
God should continue as a characteristic of Islam” (EOI, 138). Demonstrating the “excellence” of Islam,
Ahmad points out that “It is Islam alone which conveys the good news of that path [converse with
God]. All other people have since long sealed up divine revelation” (PTI, 184). Since direct experience
alone is the highest level of certainty, Ghulam Ahmad deems it necessary that God “did not design
that divine revelation should be sealed up for the future and the world should thus be destroyed”
(PTI, 185). Or, “There is no worse concept concerning Islam than to say that it is a dead religion whose
blessings were confined only to its beginning” (EOI, 166).
4.3. Revelations and Dreams
Ahmad refers to “revelation” as converse with God. When such converse is coupled with a social
mission, it becomes prophecy and that too is more common in Islam than is often acknowledged
according to him. But revelation per se is even more common for those who have established a “perfect
relationship with God Almighty” (EOI, 102). In this final stage of liqa,’ the converse with God is sensory:
from time to time God, the Benevolent, causes His eloquent and delicious words to issue from
his tongue . . . Very often they comprise great prophecies which relate to vast and universal
affairs . . . Some of these prophecies are related to himself or to his children, or wives,
or relations, or friends, or enemies, and some have a wider scope. To him are revealed
matters that are not disclosed to others, and to him are opened the doors of the unseen
which are not opened to others . . . His eye is given a visionary power through which he can
see hidden events. Very often written statements are presented before his eyes ... He can
often hear the voice of angels and finds comfort in it at times of disturbance. Even more
surprisingly, he can sometimes hear the voice of inanimate objects, vegetables, and animals
. . . Very often he can smell good news and can perceive the bad odor of disagreeable matters.
His heart is endowed with the faculty of intuition. Many things flit across his mind and
prove true. (EOI, 103–4)
I was vouchsafed visions of spiritual light in the shape of bright columns of green and red so
beautiful and enchanting that their description cannot be conveyed in words. These columns
extended up to heaven. Some of them were bright white, some green and some red . . .
these columns were a representation of the interaction of the love between God and His
servant. It was a light that proceeded upwards from the heart and there was a second light
that descended from above. The meeting of the two took the shape of a column (TAD, 26–27).
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Sometimes, in a dream or a vision, spiritual matters assume physical shape and are seen as
human beings. (TAD, 31)
The visions and dreams are thus almost tactile. At one place, he describes meeting Muhammad,
who “embraced me and I saw that rays of light proceeded from his countenance and entered into
me. I felt these rays were like palpable light and I believed that I was seeing them not only through
my spiritual sight but also with my physical eyes” (TAD, 56). The visions opened up a universe that
Ahmad specifically points out are beyond the ken of ordinary human imagination. He recalls a time
when he was stuck at an early stage of writing his famous Barahin-e-Ahmadiyya, “proceeding in the
dark night of his own concepts, when suddenly from behind the curtain of the unseen came a voice:
‘Verily, I am your Lord’ [in Arabic]. Such mysteries were then revealed as were beyond the reach of
reason and imagination” (TAD, 147).
In a state of liqa,’ Ghulam Ahmad had revelations describing him as Adam, Abraham, Musa,
Joseph, Ali, frequently Jesus, and even Mary. At one point, he had a vision that he was God, and that
his thoughts manifested as actions and events in the world. In this vision, he even created the world
and heavens by his mere command. But this meant for him that he felt his entire Self dissolved and
filled with Divine Light: “My whole structure was demolished and only the structure of the Lord of
the universe remained visible” (TAD, 248–49).
Continuity of converse is crucial for Ahmad, as is the quality of certainty: “In the design of God,
Prophethood in my case means only the frequency of converse with God” (EOI, 132). The discourse
might be direct as if a person is speaking to another. But it can also be in the form of waking dreams,
or even sleeping dreams. Hence there is great emphasis amongst Ahmadis on dream interpretation,
and more so on interpreting the recorded dreams of Ahmad himself.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, I set out to compare Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s writings with the Persianate school of
Illuminationist theosophy, focusing on Ahmad’s prophetology, epistemology, and notion of revelation.
The analysis of Ahmad’s texts found connections in his epistemology to the Illuminationist schema of
Mundus Imaginalis, as elaborated by Henry Corbin. Although Ghulam Ahmad himself refers only
occasionally to Ibn-al-’Arabi, and never at all to Suhravardi (founder of the Illuminationist school),
the similarities are striking and, at the very least, deserving of further investigation. These include
the use of metaphors of light and darkness, the idea that experience is the highest level of certainty,
polishing the heart to ascend to spiritual knowledge, and the presence of a “real” realm that can be
accessed by adepts partly through devotion.
Ghulam Ahmad also amply echoes Suhravardi’s emphasis on access to the imaginal realm being
a gift of God. Also similar is the emphasis on spiritual knowledge of what is unseen by others
(the mundus imaginalis), which may also be manifested in this world and in the adept’s senses such
as their eyes or ears. There is also the appreciation that access to the imaginal is not only possible,
but indeed is an invitation by God that many have taken up throughout the ages. Finally, although
again Ghulam Ahmad does not define it as such, his interpretations of various verses of the Qur’an,
connote Corbin’s definition of ta’wil: taking the verse back to its origin. This is most evident in Ahmad’s
discussion of the cryptic Surah al-Kahf (chp. 18) in EOI (295–310). In other places, he particularly refers
to liqa’ as the place of understanding how the visible is connected to the unseen origin.
There are points of convergence in this epistemology with mystical Sufi traditions, especially in
South Asia, and a case can be made for linking Ahmad’s claims to ecstatic pronouncements by some
Sufis.7 Ghulam Ahmad’s claims to being mujaddid (reformer) connects with many Sufi claims, and his
7 As above, Ghulam Ahmad had been wary of establishing a Sufi lineage, since he felt that their practices had become
generally corrupted and monetized in India, and that many were not strict enough in stressing the general requirements of
Islam. Moreover, the consistency and breadth of his revelations seem to have exceeded those of many Indian Sufis.
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claim to being muhaddath (spoken to by God) is atypical for orthodox Sunnism but resonates with some
pronouncements of mystics in Islamic history. However, his claim to being masih (messiah) is more
specific and is much less common amongst Sufis. What is truly at stake in the Ahmadi persecution
is Ahmad’s claim that he received revelation of being nabi (prophet). Although it is rare to find such
public announcements made by Sufis, the way in which Ghulam Ahmad uses this category connotes
a long-standing mystical tradition of fina-fi-il-Rusool (negation of one’s identity into the Prophet’s).8
Even further, the 10th century AD Persian mystic Mansur al-Hallaj is famous for making what many
saw as a claim to divinity, as well as other “ecstatic” pronouncements, that eventually led to his
execution (Massignon 1994).
Yet, Sufism is a very broad category and Ghulam Ahmad himself had been wary of establishing a
Sufi lineage, since he felt that Sufi practices had become generally corrupted and monetized in India.
He also pointed out that many Sufi orders were not strict enough in stressing the general requirements
of Islam. Moreover, the consistency and breadth of his revelations seem to have exceeded those of
many Indian Sufis. Finally, Sufism entails no obvious, common epistemology. By contrast, all four of
Ghulam Ahmad’s claims can be readily and identifiably housed within a Persianate, theosophical chain,
where they resonate epistemologically. This tradition has also been defined in the category of Islamic
mysticism or “Sufism” (Ziai 1990). Situating Ahmad’s epistemology in this different tradition from
Friedmann’s (Arabist, theological) lineage, we emerge with a distinct frame for the claims themselves
as well as their implications.
When connected with the theosophical tradition, the declaration of heresy against Ahmadis in
Pakistan, and their virtually universal exclusion by Muslims worldwide, takes on new significance.
The exclusion does not so much appear as a defense of the finality of prophethood of Muhammad
(which was not in contest), but rather as a concentration on literal definition of “prophethood” and an
exclusion of the epistemological principles at stake in Ghulam Ahmad’s claims. Prime among these
is the ability to converse with God, itself based on the faith that the doors to such converse remain
open in Islam. Ghulam Ahmad’s further claim that he is the second coming of the savior prophesied
in many other religions—Hinduism and possibly Zoroastrianism—in addition to Christianity and
Islam, might be an indication that he believes the doors to the Imaginal are open to other faiths as well,
albeit only through his guidance.
A crucial point in his claims is self-critique of the body of Muslims. For Ahmad, prophets are
defined not only by converse with God but also by their social mission. Which, in turn, implies the need
for such a mission: typically, the errancy of Muslims. In other words, for Ahmad, a prophet does not
choose himself, but rather is chosen by God in order to fulfill a mission of correction that God deems
necessary. With the exclusion of Ahmad’s epistemology, this need is likewise marginalized: if there can
be no prophets then there is, concomitantly, no need for God’s critique of the faithful. By closing the
door to the imaginal, Sunnism pushes God further out of the human realm, and the right of judgment
on religiosity is taken into human hands.
Another important feature of Ahmad’s thought is the need for Muslims and others to recognize
his claim and to approach God through his path. In that way, bay’t is an essential act for an Ahmadi
who accepts Ghulam Ahmad as their guide. As discussed above, bay’t is an act of spiritual initiation,
tying the initiate to the spiritual teachings of their guide. As such, it severely undermines the authority
of clerics. By implication, banning Ahmadi practices and communications also bans the claim that
individual Muslims have the duty and the right to “polish their hearts” and prepare for God’s grace to
receive access to the imaginal realm. Such soul-working is placed, instead, in the hands of “authorized”
clergy and no others.
8 This is a traditional goal of mystical union. Abu Yazid Bustami (d. 874), Abu Bakr Shibli (d. 945), Syed Abdul Qadir
Jilani (d. 1166), Khwaja Mu’innuddin Chishti (d. 1236), and Farid Ganj Shakkar (d. 1265) are just some who made similar
pronouncements. For a thorough account, see the testimony in Aziz (1987).
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The specific ban on Ahmadi literature in Pakistan, supported by Muslims elsewhere, makes the
epistemological exclusion more pronounced. Such exclusion may well auger further Sunni exclusions
of similar epistemologies, including mystical Islam, or Sufism, and Shi’ism. If persecution of
Ahmadiyyat is truly a “modern” phenomenon, then further exclusions are inevitably as Muslims
continue to modernize. Indeed, evidence is beginning to appear of exclusions of such Islamic traditions
long held to be “mainstream.” So, in Pakistan and Bangladesh, for instance, it is becoming more
common to label Shias as heretical, although Shi’ism has a very long history in the region and Shias
could even account for a fifth of the population in Pakistan (Nasr 2006). The community of Ismaili
Shias is very small indeed, but also has a long history of charity and business activity in India
and Pakistan. Yet, the community’s members increasingly face popular violence and discrimination.
Further research in intellectual history is needed to probe whether there are epistemological similarities
in the traditions being excluded by Sunni Islam in South Asia and around the world. Such was the
case for Bahai persecution in late 19th century Iran, for example. The founder, Bahaullah, also claimed
to have frequent converse with God besides claiming the title of Imam Mahdi in the Shia sense of the
manifestation of the 12th imam.9 Bahais remain persecuted throughout the Muslim world ever since.
By way of context, 19th century British India (just like Persia) was experiencing a wave of
colonial “modernization” at Ahmad’s time. Scientific education, often tangentially translated into
scientism in the colonies, was being promoted in public policies (Qadir 2013). Even Muslims were
internalizing the understanding of Islam as a “world religion,” which would therefore be subject to
scientific interpretation and development in the same vein as Protestant Christianity. The Persianate,
theosophical tradition of Illumination and access to the imaginal—that had roots in South Asia—did
not fit into colonial modernity’s vision of religion.
When Ahmadi exclusion is connected to the convergence with colonial modernity, as earlier,
it is possible to state this as an axiom to be tested: growing scientific modernization is correlated
with increasing exclusion (even hereticization) of belief in access to the imaginal. Indeed, it might be
revealing to examine modern instances of religious “heresy” and their correlation with perceptions of
modernization.10 In the case of modern Islam, what Bahais, Sufis and Shias may have in common with
Ghulam Ahmad’s epistemology is the “heretical” notion that Muslims can still knock at heaven’s door.
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